The Leninist State under Threat? The Politics of Economic Reform in China by White, Gordon
Gordon White
The rise to power of the economic reformers in China
is not an isolated political event, but one which has
parallels in other state socialist societies in both East
and South. It is the thesis of this article that the reform
phenomenon is a characteristic (and probably
ineluctable) stage of a particular pattern of socialist
development which one might call the classic Leninist
trajectory. This traditional mode of socialist develop-
ment began in the Soviet Union, was transferred to
Eastern Europe and was later adopted by the first
wave of revoluntary socialist regimes in the Third
World, notably China, North Korea, Vietnam and
Cuba. In each Third World case, a period of
revolutionary struggle was followed by the assumption
of power by a communist or workers' party which
established a one-party political system and organised
a fundamental transformation of the economy involving
socialisation of industry and agriculture and the
construction of a comprehensive framework of central
planning. The state socialist political economy in each
of these countries is of relatively long standing; though
their experience is in many ways diverse, there are
strikingly common elements (many of which they
share with Eastern Europe) on which we can base
some tentative judgements about their political and
economic dynamics as a distinct developmental genre.
It appears that they undergo certain characteristic
transitions which reflect the influence of changes in
historical conditions, society and the state, and of
certain basic problematic features of centrally planned
economies and Leninist polities.
The key determinants of transition are three: (i) the
current context - domestic and international,
economic and political, technical and social, (ii) the
evolving social structure, notably the emergence and
consolidation of new class forces, (iii) the nature of the
state as an agent of class formation and a matrix of
political relations. At each stage, these factors shape
(and are shaped by) the specific mix of institutional
alternatives characteristic of state socialism - state
action, markets and mass participation - and the
specific policy agenda of the period.
Using this broad framework, one can distinguish three
key phases and transitions in revolutionary socialist
development: (i) revolutionary voluntarism and its
limits: this initial phase involves the transition from a
revolutionary era of politico-military struggle to the
post-revolutionary stage of socialist construction. Its
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most vivid manifestations were Maoism in China and
Guevaraism in Cuba. In the initial post-revolutionary
period, the nascent state is dominated by radical
elements representing the political aspirations of the
revolutionary mass coalition; the social structure is in
turmoil and transformation; and internal and external
politico-economic conditions are threatening.
Institutionally, state-building combines with mass
mobilisation; markets are seen as power bases for
enemy classes and are subjected to increasing controls.
The policy agenda calls for rapid social and
institutional transformation. In this context, the
methodological heritage of the revolutionary period is
appropriate; as conditions change, however, its
applicability to the key problems of development is
increasingly brought into question.
(ii) Bureaucratic voluntarism and its limits: To the
extent that the strategic tasks of the immediate post-
revolutionary period are achieved, the revolutionary
model of social mobilisation is undermined. The
burgeoning state apparatus is increasingly managed
by people without revolutionary experience; a
reorganised social structure is taking shape with
institutionalised patterns of social mobility and a
strategic role for educated, primarily urban, strata; as
the state is consolidated, it manages to marginalise
domestic counter-revolutionary opposition and to
establish a modus vivendi with the external world. The
strategic task of the era becomes rapid economic
development, and the state takes on the central role in
steering the economy through a network of
increasingly complex bureaucratic organisations. In
the terminology of Max Weber, the revolution is being
'institutionalised'; from the perspective of many
former revolutionaries, 'revisionism', 'degeneration'
or 'retrogression' are setting in. Thus the transition
between stages is usually marked by political conflict
and ideological disagreement among the Party
leadership. The revolutionaries may maintain their
influence for some considerable time: in Vietnam
revolutionary methods were prolonged by the war;
Chinese Maoist leaders stayed in power for several
years after Mao's death; in north Korea former
guerilla leader Kim Il Sung still clings to power, aided
by the military confrontation with South Korea; and
in Cuba Fidel Castro has attempted to use mass
participation and popular power as a counterweight to
the growth of bureaucracy. However, the new phase of
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bureaucratic voluntarism also creates the conditions
for its own supercession.
(iii) Reform/sm and market socia//sm: In a transitional
process much analysed in socialist countries and
abroad, bureaucratic voluntarism becomes increas-
ingly irrational economically and unacceptable
politically. The new state apparatus has bred new
professionals with specialised training, reared in a
post-revoluntary environment, who develop interests
which are increasingly incompatible with those of the
politico-administration elite and further them by
technocratic means. The population wearies of
postponed consumption, and increased social
differentiation leads to proliferating sectional interests
and demands which beat on the doors of Party
hegemony. The traditional methods of directive
planning become more and more ineffective as the
economic structure becomes more complex and social
demands diversify. There are thus moves to change the
institutional mix, with more scope for markets, greater
political freedom and cultural diversity. The policy
agenda privileges economic over political reform,
concentrating on improving economic efficiency and
productivity.
This three-stage transition is, of course, an ideal type,
and sits uneasily with some cases. The uniformity of
Kim Il Sung's rule in north Korea is an apparent
counter-example, but one which has postponed rather
than avoided these critical contradictions - when the
dam breaks, the flood may be devastating. In Cuba,
the tentative market reforms of the early 1980s have
been reversed over the past year, but this reversal may
intensify rather than resolve Cuba's economic
difficulties. Moreover, the transition between stages is
not clear-cut; each new stage retains important
elements of the one preceding. The fit between
changing socio-economic requirements and political
demands on the one hand, and embedded socio-
political institutions and attitudes on the other, is not a
neat one.
China is a relatively 'pure' example of the classic
Leninist trajectory. In this article, I intend to focus on
the third transition, from a hybrid phase (1956-1976)
which combined revolutionary and bureaucratic
voluntarism, to the post-Mao phase of economic
reformism and market socialism from 1977 to the
present day. What were the political factors
underlying this transition and what are its implications
for China's political process in future?
The Politics of China's Reform Process
(i) Origins of the Reforms There are a number of
explanations of the origins of the economic reforms in
China after the death of Mao. Three types can be
discerned: political explanations which, for example,
stress political or ideological conflict within the CCP
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leadership and increasing mass disenchantment with
the Party, or highlight the importance of different
political 'generations' within the CCP elite; economic
explanations which rest on a hypothesised transition
from 'extensive' to 'intensive' growth, or emphasise
the growing contradictions between an increasingly
complex economy and a directive planning system;
class analyses which trace the emergence of a new
strata from within the state socialist political
economy, for whom the project of economic reform is
a means to a greater social power in opposition to the
apparatchiki in party and government machines.
A full analysis would need to stitch them together into
a coherent analytical tapestry. I do not intend to
undertake this task here. Instead, I shall adopt a
different approach to the political origins of the
economic reform which interprets them as a revolt
against the state and an assault on the state. From this
perspective, the central contradiction of socialist
development in the classic Leninist mould is that
between state and society (overlapping with, but
distinguishable from, an analysis of classes and
strata). The politcal impetus behind the reforms
emerges from a growing tension between state and
society and the increasing deleterious impact of the
former on the latter.
In China, this tension took various forms in the pre-
reform period. Ideologically, state ownership was
defined as superior to other forms of production, and
cooperative institutions in both industry and
agriculture were pressured to aspire to this status. This
atmosphere stifled non-state economic initiatives and
impeded economic diversification. In all spheres, the
interests of the state were given precedence over those
of the collective and the individual. Politically, there
was growing mass resentment against the everyday
depredations of the radical Maoist principle of
'politics in command', and the stormy sea of
successive political movements which beat on the
heads of the population. While the Party rationalised
its right to monocratic power in terms of the need for
firm leadership and consistent direction, moreover, it
was demonstrably unable to provide either during the
Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76). Socially, there
were clear tendencies for state officials to form a
privileged stratum in a relatively non-commercialised
system in which power counted for more than money
in determining access to scarce consumption goods.
Workers in state enterprises also developed into a
privileged stratum within a 'dualistic' working class
[Walder 1986]. Structurally. the network of party and
government organisations had extended deep into the
economy, more extensively than ever envisaged in the
heyday of the 'Soviet Model' in the 1950s. State organs
not only directly manipulated enterprises within the
state sector, but also extended direct administrative
controls over the nominally more autonomous
collective sector. In the cities, industrial co-ops were
amalgamated into 'big collectives' and managed as de
facto state enterprises. In the countryside, state and
party controls extended directly into the commune
system [Gray 1985]. As a mode of economic
regulation this degree of etatisation was both
inefficient and ineffective. Strategically, there emerged
a 'state bias' in development policies [Nolan and
White 1984].
In part, this last development reflected action by the
state to further what it perceived as the wider interests
of society as a whole (long vs. the short term interests,
the whole vs. the part). Regardless of good intentions,
and even granted that state officials might be
genuinely striving for a 'general interest', however,
this perspective is highly problematic given the
Leninist state's lack of accountability to its mass
constituency and the lack of effective channels for the
expression of social interests. In part, 'state bias'
represented a process whereby the state increasingly
came to act 'for itself', to represent apparatchik rather
than worker-peasant interests. This transformation in
the social nature of the state may create a link between
the state and development strategy which is
pathological - the interests and continued well-being
of the state stratum became entwined with a
commitment to rapid industrialisation and high levels
of accumulation. This maintains or reinforces a 'state-
biased' pattern of development which stresses industry
over agriculture, production over exchange and
services, producer over consumer goods, state over
collective ownership, and which fails adequately to
deliver benefits to the general population in terms of
steadily rising standards of living.
Once again, there is a kind of 'Catch 22' operating
here. A pervasive state is established in the initial stage
of industrialisation for defensible reasons, but then
outstays its historical welcome as a bastion of
economic irrationality and political authoritarianism.
The state increasingly takes on the character of a
chrysalis which will not open to allow the butterfly to
go free. Economic and political progress increasingly
demands a transformation of the state itself and of the
relationship between state and society. At the same
time, the tensions generated by these contradictions-
in terms of productivity foregone through systematic
inefficiency, sluggish income growth for the majority
of the population, the apathy or antagonism created
by pervasive politicisation and authoritarian control
- provide the political impetus behind pressures for
reform.
(ii) The political content of economic reform policies.
From this point of view, the economic reforms can be
seen as an assault on the state. This is reflected in the
main thrusts of the programme: away from directive
towards 'guidance' planning, greater autonomy for
productive enterprises, expansion of market
mechanisms and diversification of the structure of
economic ownership. Of course. as the use of the term
'economic reform' indicates, sponsors in the CCP
leadership only wish to bring about a limited
readjustment of the role of the state, which will leave
the framework of central planning intact and will be
mainly addressed to the economic rather than political
aspects ofthe states' role. Clearly others in China, less
wedded to the status quo, would like the principle of
marketisation togo much further (on the Yugoslavian
model) and the economic reforms to be accompanied
by equally thoroughgoing political reforms to
promote democratisation.
If the state-society divide is a useful mode of
explanation, it should help to analyse the differential
impact of the reforms and the reaction of different
groups: i.e. there should be clear differences between
groups which base their social power on political,
administrative or military office, or on the statist
mode of production as a whole, and those whose
sources of power are elsewhere and who would benefit
from a change in the economic rules of the game.
Bauman's distinction between officialdom and class,
as two alternative and competing power structures in
socialist society provides a helpful starting point for
analysing the distinction between state and society
{Bauman 1974; cf. Parkin 1972 for a similar analysis].
In the Chinese context, this can be applied to
distinguish those whose access to social resources
depends on political and administrative authority on
the one hand (officialdom) and on marketable
productive skills on the other (class). The power
structure based on class actually includes two
hierarchies: one based on marketable skills in which
the 'high intelligentsia' occupy the apex and one based
on private control over economic resources including
both capital and labour. In our analysis of the genesis
and initial impact of the economic reforms, the latter
category is not so significant, since the system of
political economy operating up to 1978 prevented the
rise of private economic power. As we shall see later,
however, this category is very useful for analysing the
longer term political effects of the reforms, particularly
in the countryside.
This distinction would lead us to hypothesise that the
realm of officialdom would resist the reforms and the
realm of class (based on skill) would favour them. As a
very general (and rather crude) framework of analysis,
this seems to fit the situation. Class based elites have
tended to welcome the reforms, since they promise to
re-define the rules of access to social resources in their
favour and to the detriment of officialdom, and to free
them from the restraints previously imposed by
officialdom (for example, on job mobility or use of
financial resources).
To sharpen our analysis ofthe political implications of
the state-society divide, however, we need to make
several further distinctions. First, the distinction helps
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to clarify the attitudes of different groups within the
state apparatus itself. The term 'state cadre' is a
heterogeneous category, including political cadres
(mainly party cadres), administrative cadres and
'technical cadres'. One would expect - and available
evidence would support this expectation - that the
last category would favour the economic reform (since
it redistributes power in their favour away from the
first two) even though it might undermine the power of
their own institutions.
Second, one can identify a kind of 'base-superstructure'
divide within the state sector of the economy, i.e.
between the bureaucratic agencies of plan making and
implementation on the one hand, and basic-level units
of production on the other. These are distinct, and
potentially conflicting, matrices of interest and power.
There is a contest for control over the basic processes
of economic production and social reproduction
between these two spheres. To the extent that the
economic reforms weaken the former and strengthen
the latter, one would expect two types of reform
constituency: first, enterprise managerial and technical
elites vis-à-vis their bureaucratic supervisors and,
second, within enterprises between 'representatives' of
the state (Party officials or external managerial
appointees) and those managers and professionals
who wish to assert more unrestricted control over their
own and their enterprises' activities. These distinctions
do reflect political realities, but only to a limited
degree since many industrial managers have become
accustomed to the old system and are reluctant to
change it. Moreover, the interests of different groups
within the enterprise (notably the distinction between
managers/professionals and manual workers) differ
considerably and their reactions to the reforms follow
suit.
Third, there is the distinction between the state sector
and non-state sectors, i.e. between all those on the
state payroll, including manual workers in state
enterprises, and those in collective or private
economic institutions. In the urban areas, many state
manual workers have been sceptical about the reforms
because they fear an erosion in the 'dualist' differential
between the state and collective sectors, or are
concerned about an increase in the disciplinary powers
of management and the attempts to rescind the
principle of job security for state workers (abolishing
the so-called 'iron rice-bowl'). Conversely, many
urbanities outside the state sector have benefitted
from recent official encouragement of collective and
(particularly) private business. In the countryside, it is
clear that the main opponents of the spread of
household-based 'responsibility systems' have been
the cadres (at production team, production brigade
and commune levels) whose previous power platforms
have been dismantled. Yet, there is overwhelming
evidence of grassroots peasant support for the
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institutional changes which abolished or loosened the
state's directive planning controls over agricultural
production. Indeed, the Party's acceleration of rural
reforms seems to have been a response to pressure
from below.
As a first-order contradiction, the divide between state
and society, state and non-state economic sectors,
gives us a broad picture of the pattern of support,
acquiescence or resistance to the reforms. But it is
clearly only a first step in more comprehensive
political analysis which would have to examine other
first-order contradictions (for example, based on
class) and second-order factors which contribute to
political diversity, such as inter-institutional conflict,
ideological disagreement, regional variations and age
differences. While this approach privileges the state-
society divide to explain political behaviour, it is
rooted in the structural features of pre-reform etatist
political economy. To the extent that, in the urban-
industrial sector, the impact of economic reform has
so far been superficial, the approach retains its
analytical relevance. However, to the extent that
successful reforms bring about a shift in the
distribution of social power and diminish the socio-
economic role of the state, they may usher in new types
of politics, a prospect to which we now turn.
(iii) Political impact of the reforms. In the last issue of
this Bulletin, I attempted to assess the political impact
of China's economic reforms in the rural sector where
the pace and degree of change has been impressive
[White 1987]. My central theses were, first, that the
reforms may produce an institutional vacuum in the
countryside which cannot accommodate the
accompanying process of socio-economic diversifi-
cation; and second, that they carry the potential for
creating alternative centres of market power, based on
private control over economic resources, which may
change the basic nature of rural politics and lead to
tension with the state institutions which remain in
place. The rise of new political forces and issues
requires a new framework of political institutions to
regulate interaction, absorb pressures and contain
conflict. This will very probably require greater scope
for the activity of new socio-economic organisations,
with a degree of independence from the state, which
represent the rapidly differentiating constellation of
rural interests (notably new forms of marketing and
producer associations).
One can also make a case that a process of gradual
political democratisation, either direct or repre-
sentative, at the village rural and township level is
advisable to act as a check on emerging local elites,
whether party/government officials, or a new rural
bourgeoisie or rich peasant stratum, and to provide a
framework for managing and containing the more
complex processes of local politics which the reforms
appear to be ushering into the Chinese countryside.
In the heartland of the state economy, the urban-
industrial sector, the pace of reforms has been far
more uneven and slow and the degree of significant
change far less. The CCP leadership appears
committed to the deepening of the reform process,
however, and, to the extent that they are successful, a
significant decentralisation and diversification of
economic power will take place, as in the rural sector,
in this case flowing from the transfer of decision-
making power from Party or state officials to the
managers of enterprises. Enterprise managers, in both
public and non-public sectors, will wish to organise
and assert their power in relation to the political and
administrative authorities. Early signs of this process
are already visible: in organisational terms the
establishment of intermediate institutions such as
trade associations of state, collective or private firms
which are acting as mediating bodies between
individual firms and the regulatory authorities; in
social terms, the emergence of a new stratum of
'entrepreneurs' (or in the Chinese translation
'enterprisers', qíyejia) i.e. enterprise managers who are
developing an esprit de corps distinct from both state
officials on the one side and their workforces on the
other.
Therefore, in the urban industrial as in the rural
sector, one can expect the evolution of a more complex
and decentralised political process over economic
issues, with new institutional and group actors. This
will bring two major changes in the Chinese political
process: first, relations between enterprises and their
representatives on the one hand, and the party-state
apparatus on the other, will be based more on
bargaining and compromise than previously; second,
the Party itself will need to change its role, away from a
traditional conception of leadership based on
hierarchical subordination and politico-ideological
mobilisation to one which can accommodate to and
mediate between competing economic interests. One
end-point to this emerging process of political change
might well be some form of 'socialist pluralism' along
corporatist lines.
Conclusion: Prospects for Democratisation
One could regard the emergence of this kind of
corporatist pluralism as one expression of political
liberalisation or democratisation, but one should not
then leap to the conclusion that successful economic
liberalisation will bring in sweeping political demo-
cratisation. The Yugoslavian case, where expansion of
the market has not been accompanied by significant
political reform, would suggest the contrary, as would
those Third World capitalist contexts (such as Chile)
where economic liberalism has been symbiotic with
political authoritarianism. Indeed the CCP leadership
would argue that the maintenance of strong
authoritarian controls are necessary because of the
need to manage the economic reform.
Democratisation worth the name would embody
certain central features other than the 'corporate
pluralism' identified above as the most likely political
outcome of the economic reforms. Three are
particularly important: (i) the protection of the
political rights of individuals in relation to the group,
organisation, collective or state by an effective and
autonomous legal system, by institutionalised checks
on bureaucratic or political injustice (for example,
through special appeal and arbitration procedures, or
independent ombudsmen) and by mechanisms to
ensure the accountability of public officials; (ii) an
increase in the political rights of the population as
citizens, i.e. their ability to influence the direction of
social development and the content of planning
through electoral processes and representative
institutions; (iii) the rights of individuals or groups as
producers or 'citizens of the workplace' and their
extension through forms of worker control and
self-management.
The impact of the economic reforms on these
dimensions of democratisation is likely to be
ambiguous. On the positive side, the evident need for a
more comprehensive framework of economic law to
regulate the proposed 'socialist commodity economy'
may strengthen the role of law generally and extend its
protection beyond the economic sphere. On the
negative side, however, the attempt to rationalise
industrial relations through the adoption of Western
management techniques flies directly in the face of any
attempt to establish worker self-management in
Chinese enterprises; nor is there any evidence of an
organic link between economic decentralisation and
the growth of representative political institutions.
It is true that the post-Mao period of economic reform
has brought some limited improvements in Chinese
political life. The range of economic, intellectual and
cultural freedom has expanded considerably, and the
intrusion of the state into the private sphere has
declined. Within the Party, there is greater scope for
debate and disagreement; outside the Party there have
been limited steps towards democratisation. In 1979,
for example, the principle of direct elections was
extended to county-level People's Congresses; in
enterprises, the role of 'workers representative
congresses' has been increased to give workers a
limited say in management decisions. But these have a
marginal impact on the overall distribution of power
which is still set in the [.eninist mould; nor do they go
very far in increasing the accountability of public
officials.
Many Chinese, including a new breed of political
scientist, would argue that further democratisation is
necessary in all the senses identified above. Apart from
the proposition that a distinctively socialist transition
is unthinkable without it, they would argue that it is
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also developmentally essential. China has passed that
phase when the argument that democracy must be
subordinated to the priorities of industrialisation still
carried weight, and has already entered a new stage
when democratisation must be seen as a precondition
for furthcr social and economic advance. However,
the obstacles to democratisation are still severe. China
is still a poor country, where the struggle for everyday
life limits the capacity of citizens to devote significant
time and energy to political activity. The dead hand of
traditional authoritarian political culture still grips
hard; and conservative vested interests in the Party-
state apparatus are still powerful.
To the extent that these demands for democratisation
gain force the Party faces some difficult choices. Even
if it retains its monopoly position, it must accept a
considerable diminution of its ability to control
events. It is clear that genuine democratisation will
require a major change in the role of the 'vanguard'
Party. Historical experience suggests that, whereas in
the earliest phases of socialist transition, the Party is
seen as the solution, in later stages, it becomes the
problem. This problem reflects deep contradictions at
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